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" N o t I " — S a y s B e c k e t t 
Edith Kern* 
In 1972, Beckett's play Not I saw its world premiere in New York City on 
the occasion of a festival organized in the author 's honor by Jessica Tandy and 
H u m e Cronyn. The staging of the play—an unusually short one acter— 
caused some frustrations even to Alan Schneider who had long since 
established himself as the American Beckett director par excellence. But it 
proved even more perturbing to its cast upon whom it made demands that 
prevented any display of their thespian skills and that put them instead under 
great physical strain. 1 For Not Fs cast, consisting of only two actors—a woman 
referred to in the program notes as Mouth (played in 1972 by Jessica Tandy) 
and a man designated as Auditor (whose part was taken by Henderson 
Forsythe), is not permitted to present the audience with interpretations of any 
kind, certainly not of any visual or physical nature. The actors cannot move 
their bodies or use any facial expression to convey meaning, mood, or 
emotion, for the simple reason that they are almost invisible and by far more 
impersonal than any commedia dell' arte masks, behind whose rigid exterior 
the actor's personal presence is still felt. During the performance of Not / only 
a female voice is heard. We see of the actress no more than an incessantly 
chattering mouth, placed, according to stage directions, "upstage audience 
right, about eight feet above stage level, faintly lit from close-up and below, 
rest of face in shadow." 2 And it is only if the audience—perhaps alerted by the 
Program Notes—strain their eyes that they recognize downstage left (stage 
directions) the figure of Auditor, totally inert—except for four brief moments 
of agitated screaming—completely enveloped in a black djellaba, his back 
turned almost entirely to the audience, as he stares diagonally across the stage 
at Mou th . 3 
Beckett had freely admitted to some critics that the figure of Auditor had 
been suggested to him by a Caravaggio painting, " T h e Beheading of Saint 
John the Bapt is t , " 4 and in a recent note to me added the personal explanation 
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that, on beholding that painting one day, "showing at a safe distance, a group 
of watchers intent on the happening" (i.e. the beheading), he felt "from 
another outsidedness, . . . both the horror and its being beheld." We cannot 
but feel that, with such observations, Beckett makes us, the audience, part of 
his intricate game of ironies, wherein we become beholders of Beckett's 
beholding of Auditor who, in turn, from a safe distance, beholds the drama of 
Mouth. We are forced as it were to assume an attitude of "not I " in the 
manner of the onlookers in Caravaggio's painting, who distance themselves as 
they avert their eyes from the beheading. Those of us who have watched 
Vincent Price as host of the mystery series "Dea th of an Expert Witness" are 
also reminded of his mentioning in conclusion the author's (P.D. James's) 
hope that, upon perusing her novels of crime, the reader might proclaim "not 
I . " 
But what is Mouth 's drama? What is the crime? Wherein consists the 
horror? What, indeed, is the sense of that verbal avalanche that bursts forth 
from Mouth's lips, teeth, and tongue in their unceasing, obsessive and almost 
obscene motion? As we are assaulted by the painfully rapid staccato of her 
incomplete and disjointed phrases, we find it impossible to discern any of the 
traditional trappings of theater. Mouth ' s lines convey neither character nor 
plot with a happy or unhappy ending. If one of those waiting in Beckett's 
Waiting for Godot could rightly lament "Nothing happens, nobody comes, 
nobody goes, it's awful," then Not I deserves to be declared even more awful. 
For it lacks the earlier play's fascinating clowning and the intriguing dialogues 
between Estragon and Vladimir with their mixture of the tragic, the lyrical, 
and the farcical. Even the title "No t I " remains puzzling, for these words are 
nowhere to be found in the lines of Mouth 's monologue. Yet Beckett—no 
matter how reticently—has hinted at deeper meanings and has provided links 
between text and title. Some of these links are indirect, such as the unspoken 
"not I " inherent in the ironic relationship that we have noticed between the 
drama of Mouth, the Auditor, Beckett himself as author, and the audience; or 
as the duress under which the actors have been placed in order to deny 
themselves any expression of individuality in their acting, their obligation to 
deny their egos and say "no t I " as it were. But other links are more directly a 
part of the text and entice us to look for hidden meanings. First among those, 
and particularly startling on stage, is the fact that Mouth, though speaking 
exclusively of herself, uses the third person rather than the first person 
pronoun and thus never says " I " and, by implication, seems to be saying 
"not I . " We may well assume, therefore, that Mouth ' s outpourings contain 
further clues as to the meaning of such nay-saying and must closely scrutinize 
her lines in the hope of discovering them. 
It is fortunate, therefore, that from her seemingly random and gram-
natically incomplete utterings some phrases stand out, because their frequent 
•epetition gives them the mesmerizing quality of refrains. Let us listen to 
hem: 
words were coming 
her voice alone 
just the mouth 
whole body like gone 
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can't stop the stream 
trying to make sense of it 
must have cried as a baby . . . 
perhaps not . . . 
just the birth cry to get her going 
God is love . . . she'll be purged 
guilty or not guilty? 
tiny little thing . . . out before its time . . 
crawl back in 
begging it all to s top 5 
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. godforsaken hole . . . no love 
The refrains clearly speak of Mouth ' s aloneness, her desire to make sense 
of life, her suffering, her concern with guilt and divine punishment or pardon, 
her premature ejection as it were from the godforsaken hole, and her desire to 
crawl back into it and to make it all stop. They speak of life, death, suffering 
and punishment, and we are reminded of certain verbal exchanges between 
Estragon and Vladimir in Waiting for Godot, while we also seem to hear echoes 
of Beckett's trilogy of novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnamable. 
Estragon and Vladimir are profoundly concerned with guilt and salvation and 
on one occasion want to hang themselves in order to end it all. At the 
beginning of the novel Molloy—actually the end of the titular hero's veritable 
calvary—the protagonist, having dragged his more and more decaying body 
through dark woods and muddy ditches, literally crawls into his mother's 
room that clearly resembles a womb or a tomb. Malone in Malone Dies, telling 
himself stories as he is waiting for death, says of himself that he is "being 
given birth to into dea th . " The Unnamable of the novel by that title—himself 
as nameless as the world around him—questions his own identity and laments 
" I say I, knowing it 's not I " and, not unlike Mouth, decides to use the third 
person pronoun when speaking of himself: " I shall not say I again, ever again, 
it 's too farcical. I shall put in its place, whenever I hear it, the third person, if I 
think of i t . " 6 
But Mouth 's references to guilt and salvation associated with those of birth 
and death not only remind us of Beckett's Waiting for Godot, they also conjure 
up the biblical story of the Fall, which is the beginning of man ' s suffering and 
which coincides with his gaining of consciousness and individuation. The 
Bible tells us that man was created by God in His image and, like Him, was 
immortal. Yet God set limits to that likeness: neither the knowledge of good 
and evil, nor the knowledge of self was granted Adam and Eve. When the 
serpent tempted Eve, the serpent promised to remove these restrictions, 
saying "et eritis sicut del" you will be like the gods. Adam's and Eve's guilt 
initially springs from their desire to acquire divine consciousness and 
knowledge and with them the ability to differentiate, hitherto reserved for 
God. The arrogant desire on the part of man to be like the gods meets with 
severe punishment not only in the biblical story of the Fall but also in 
innumerable legends and myths of cultures outside the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Nowhere and at no time will the gods condone man ' s transgression 
of the limits they have set to his powers of understanding and thereby his 
governance of the world. We have but to recall the cruel punishment meted 
out even to the half-god Prometheus for having given fire to man—that source 
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of power previously provided only through divine whim by means of the rays 
of the sun or in the form of lightning. We may think of the fate of those who 
tried to build the tower of Babel that was to raise them to the level of the gods; 
or of the lot of Ulysses, the admirable and intrepid Greek hero and seafarer, 
whom Dante, in his Divine Comedy, relegated to the deepest recesses of Hell 
because he had dared to sail beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, transgressing, in 
his zest for exploration and adventure, what was permitted to man. 
But if in the biblical story of the Fall, man 's arrogance vis-a-vis God, his 
thirst for forbidden knowledge is at the center of his disgrace, the story also 
implies that, without this desire and without the subsequent knowledge, 
Adam and Eve would have never been truly human: the process of their 
individuation would have never taken place. We are told that Adam's and 
Eve's "eyes are opened" as soon as they have eaten of the forbidden fruit. 
They at once gain consciousness of themselves and of the world around them. 
For the first time they are now ashamed of their nakedness and, above all, 
conscious of their having sinned. Their newly acquired ability to differentiate 
between good and evil provides them at once with a sense of guilt. And while 
their new consciousness and the process of their individuation have made 
them superior to the rest of creation, these qualities have also set them apart 
and torn them away forever from the world harmony of which they had 
hitherto been a part. This alone was the equivalent of their losing Paradise— 
even if no specific judgment had been pronounced. Because of his individua-
tion and consciousness, guilt and suffering had henceforth to be man's lot. 
The avenging angel driving Adam and Eve from Paradise only confirms what 
has already come about. 
Now it is interesting that Adam's first act upon gaining individuation is his 
attempt to deny the process and the fact. When God calls him, he at first hides 
out, trying to blot out his very existence, if at all possible. He secondly rejects 
the assumption of any guilt by asserting that it was Eve who had offered him 
the fruit—which is but another way of saying "no t I, I am not guilty—I do not 
really exist." Eve in her turn accuses the serpent of having beguiled her, 
assuming the same attitude of "not I, I am not guilty." The "not I " of the 
Fall—though implicit rather than explicit—resembles the "no t I " P.D.James 
hopes the readers of her crime stories to assert. It reveals an attitude not unlike 
that of the "outs iders" viewing the beheading of Saint John the Baptist on 
Caravaggio's canvas and wishing to keep their distance from the horror they 
dare not fully face—though they cannot escape it. 
However, the "no t I " of the Fall is also an attempt to make undone what 
no longer can be made undone: the loss of Paradise is irreparable. The "not 
I " expresses the vain desire to regain that lost Paradise through a willingness 
to surrender the privilege of individuation and knowledge. In Not I, Mouth's 
longing to crawl back might be seen as a similar desire to annul individuation 
because of its concomitant suffering: a reversal of the process of birth and a 
regression to the undifferentiated world harmony that preceded it. Obviously, 
Mouth's drama is that she cannot crawl back. Yet I believe that the meaning 
of the play is more complex; that it represents in artistic form the epitome of 
the author's credo as an artist—echoing and continuing to some extent 
Nietzschean deliberations on the artist's self and his art—; but that it also— 
and in yet another sense—mouthes Beckett's credo as a man. 
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Notions that man ' s lot is inseparable from suffering and that it would have 
been better for him to have never been born (for the very fact that he is a 
conscious being) are expressed in the myths of many civilizations. Struck by 
their predominance in Greek thought, Nietzsche cites in The Birth of Tragedy an 
old legend propounding this notion in what the philosopher calls its "popular 
wisdom." The legend has it " t ha t King Midas hunted a long time in the 
woods for the wise Silenus, companion of Dionysos, without being able to 
catch him. When he had finally caught him, the king asked him what he 
considered man 's greatest good. The daemon remained sullen and uncom-
municative until finally, forced by the king, he broke into a shrill laugh and 
spoke: 'Ephemeral wretch, begotten by accident and toil, why do you force me 
to tell you what it would be your greatest boon not to hear? What would be 
best for you is quite beyond your reach: not to have been born, not to be, to be 
nothing. But the second best is to die soon.' " 8 
But Nietzsche used this legend of Silenus merely as a point of departure as 
he developed his deliberations concerning the birth of Greek tragedy and, 
most specifically, the relationship of man ' s individuation to artistic creation 
and enjoyment. Greek civilization, in Nietzsche's view, associated the 
principium individuations, the principle of individuation, with the god Apollo. 
But while appreciating on the whole the rationality and harmony of Apollo-
nian art, it felt periodically the need to break the bonds of such rationality and 
individuation. The occasions were the festivals in honor of Dionysos, the god 
of the vine and of tragedy. Dur ing such festivals, it was as if nature herself 
"were bemoaning the fact of her fragmentation, her decomposition into 
separate individuals ." 9 According to the myth—and in keeping with the 
rhythms of nature—Dionysos had to die each year at harvest time and his torn 
body returned to the earth to make possible in due time resurrection and new 
life of the vine. With his death individuation was annulled as it were, because 
his death represented the annulment of nature 's fragmentation, a return to 
Wholeness, to the great All. This is how Ernst Cassirer refers to the myth in 
The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: 
Like all great vegetation cults, that of Dionysus [sic] feels the I only as a 
violent rending away from the primal source of life, and what it strives 
for is a return to that source, the "ecs tasy" by which the soul bursts the 
fetters of the body and of individuality, to become united once more 
with universal l i fe . 1 0 
But quite in keeping with the manifold ways in which myths can be 
interpreted, Nietzsche considered Dionysos not only to be the god of tragedy 
but believed him also to be its original hero of whom all subsequent ones 
represented but variations on a theme. He concluded, therefore, that the 
protagonist's death at the end of each tragedy carried within it the same 
metaphysical solace, namely that of a reunion with the All. To Nietzsche, 
moreover, Dionysos also represented the creative artist. His death was 
symbolic of the poet, the writer, who could create great art only when 
abandoning his ego, when touching upon the ground of being, in Nietzsche's 
words, when " the mystical jubilation of Dionysos . . . breaks the spell of 
individuation and opens a path to the maternal womb of being.'"11 (I have 
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italicized the maternal womb of being because the image of a return to the womb, 
the mother or mothers, recurs frequently in literature.) Nietzsche believed great 
art to be " a triumph over subjectivity, deliverance from the self, the silencing 
of every personal will and de s i r e . " 1 2 Even the lyrical poet's / , the philosopher 
maintained, had to be "un - se lved" 1 3 and had to speak "ou t of the depth of 
b e i n g . " 1 4 Indeed, Nietzsche believed that " to the extent that the subject is an 
artist he is already delivered from individual will and has become a 
m e d i u m . " 1 5 
I have shown elsewhere in some detail how strikingly Beckett's work 
reflects similar notions of the death of individuation as a prelude to truly 
artistic creation—often using formulations that literally recall Nietzsche (or 
Schopenhauer, on whom Nietzsche often relies). 1 6 It is quite immaterial, of 
course, whether Beckett was consciously or unconsciously inspired by these 
thinkers or whether a confluence of ideas is at play here. The facts speak for 
themsleves and are compelling enough to throw some light upon the enigmas 
of Not L 
Quite early in Beckett's artistic career, the titular hero of his novel Watt 
sets out in quest of Mr. Knott (or Naught) who dwells at the center of his 
house and, indeed, the universe—all his senses closed to the world. He is, as it 
were, that undifferentiated All that, once touched upon, seems to annul all the 
logical categories and differentiations Watt had hitherto lived by: Watt 's 
experience at Mr. Knott 's house destroys the world of individuation and 
rationality that had been reflected in the language handed down to him. With 
his loss of belief in that rationality and that language, the very foundation of 
his former world, has been shaken. Nevertheless, Watt becomes not yet a truly 
Beckettian author-hero. He remains a teller of tales, a sayer—whereas each of 
the protagonists of Beckett's later trilogy is a writer, an author, consciously 
concerned with his art. Molloy, the first of these three protagonists arrives in 
his mother's room (remember the Nietzschean image of the All), transformed 
as it were, in the course of a long, painful and debilitating trek through dark 
woods and mysterious experiences, from an Apollonian rational into a 
Dionysian irrational being. In his mother 's room his only reason for existence 
is writing. For that purpose he has been rescued, by anonymous powers, from 
a ditch into which he had fallen—a totally helpless cripple. Were one to 
describe him at the time of his arrival in his mother 's room, one would do well 
to borrow Beckett's own words written about the writer-protagonist of another 
author. The author is Proust, the writer-protagonist is Marcel, and the 
moment is that of Marcel 's epiphany as a novelist. " H e is almost exempt from 
the impurity of will," Beckett wrote about Proust's Marcel. " H e deplores his 
lack of will until he understands that will, being utilitarian, a servant of 
intelligence and habit, is not a condition of the artistic experience. When the 
subject is exempt from will the object is exempt from causality (Time and 
Space taken together). And this human vegetation is purified in the transcend-
ental aperception that can capture the Model, the Idea, the Thing itself." 1 7 
(Beckett's concept and wording are here almost literally those of Schopen-
hauer as quoted by Nietzsche.) Molloy's almost vegetative physical and 
mental states are particularly noteworthy if we realize (and we are led to do so 
on the basis of his numerous, though vague and ambivalent, allusions) that in 
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the past and long before he set out to find his " m o t h e r " (we must remember, 
of course, that he found only her room resembling a womb or tomb), he had 
led a totally different existence. The novel's intricate structure, in fact, makes 
us believe that, in an earlier existence, he had been Moran , who is presented 
to us as the author-hero of the novel's second part and who, having been 
mysteriously commissioned one day to do so, had set out in quest of Molloy. 
Moran had been what we might call in Nietzschean terms a true represen-
tative of Apollonian individuation. Before setting out on his Molloy mission, 
Moran's life had been arranged by the clock and along patterns of behavior 
accepted by society. He had been meticulous, a slave of habit. His had been a 
world as respectable as it was comprehensible and describable. When he was 
called upon to search for Molloy, his quarry seemed to him his very opposite. 
With his acceptance of the Molloy mission, however, his world begins to be 
invaded by a Dionysian irrationality that slowly undermines his clarity of 
differentiation and starts to eat away at the principle of individuation. Yet he 
also comes to realize with a sense of profound shock that Molloy has always 
been a part of him and that he has always known him: "Molloy, or Mollose, 
was not a stranger" to him, although no one had previously spoken to Moran 
of Molloy. He felt at the same time that he had invented h i m . 1 8 Moran's 
attempt to envision fully his mission to search for Molloy resembles, indeed, 
an artist's letting go of rationality and surface values and his descent instead to 
the undifferentiated All: 
" I t is lying d o w n , " he writes in his report at the end of his journey, " in 
the warmth, in the gloom, that I best pierce the outer turmoil 's veil, 
discern my quarry, sense what course to follow, find peace in another's 
ludicrous distress. Far from the world, its clamours, frenzies, bitterness 
and dingy light, I pass judgment on it and on those, like me, who are 
plunged in it beyond recall, and on him who has need of me to be 
delivered, who cannot deliver myself. All is dark, but with that simple 
darkness that follows like a balm upon the great dismemberings. From 
their places masses move, stark as laws. Masses of what? One does not 
ask. There somewhere man is too, vast conglomerate of all of nature 's 
kingdoms, as lonely and as bound. And in that block the prey is lodged 
and thinks himself a being apart . . . I arrive, he comes away. His life 
has been nothing but a waiting for this, to see himself preferred, to 
fancy himself damned, blessed, to fancy himself everyman, above all 
o t h e r s . " 1 9 
Whenever Molloy came to "v i s i t " Moran (their roles—as in the case of 
each writer and his subject—were obviously interchangeable so that it is never 
clear who seeks whom), he behaved in a wild and uncontrollable manner: 
" H e hastened incessant ly." 2 0 Yet Molloy's presence had the strange effect 
that Moran, too, felt himself filled with panting: "nothing but uproar, bulk, 
rage, suffocation, effort unceasing, frenzied and vain . . , just the opposite of 
myself." 2 1 Indeed, at the end of his quest, though never having completed his 
mission, Moran seems to have become identical with Molloy when he set out 
to go to his mother. Is this sheer irony? Was Moran ' s "miss ion" to have 
precisely that effect? Was Molloy but a later stage of the Apollonian Moran on 
his way to become a Dionysian artist and ultimately to touch upon the ground 
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of being when he arrived in his mother 's room? The novel supports such 
thinking without ever being explicit about it. And yet Beckett seems to have 
foreshadowed this Moranian change into Molloy when, in his essay on Proust, 
he described the road of Marcel, that of the novelist-protagonist in Re-
membrance of Things Past, to true authorship: 
The old ego dies hard. Such as it was, a minister of dullness, it was also 
an agent of security. When it ceases to perform that second function, 
when it is opposed by a phenomenon that it cannot reduce to the 
condition of a comfortable and familiar concept, when, in a word, it 
betrays its trust as a screen to spare its victim the spectacle of reality, it 
disappears . . . with wailing and gnashing of teeth. The mortal 
microcosm cannot forgive the relative immortality of the macrocosm. 2 2 
It would seem then as if the dolorous metamorphosis of Moran into Molloy 
and Molloy's later painful groping for the ground of being, his crawling back 
into his mother's room or womb or tomb (for both death and rebirth seem to 
be implied here), is but a Beckettian Kiinstler-roman in Nietzschean terms: 
the undoing of the process of individuation, the dying of an Apollonian ego 
and the birth of a Dionysian artist. It is quite in keeping that Molloy even 
speaks of his loss of a sense of identity, his being "wrapped in a namelessness 
often hard to pene t r a t e . " 2 3 If the Moran-Molloy trek is seen as one 
continuous development, it represents the artist's moving away from intel-
ligence and fragmentation in an effort to arrive at and rediscover the pristine 
unity of the All—a notion Beckett also developed in his Dialogues with 
Duthuit, as we shall see later. And it is not surprising that the Moran-Molloy 
artist's physical changes and altered intellectual sensitivities are reflected in 
his use of language and the relationship of that language to "reali ty." Molloy 
admits that "when already all was fading, waves and particles, there could be 
no things but nameless things, no names but thingless n a m e s . " 2 4 
The making of the Dionysian artist is further pursued in the second novel 
of Beckett's trilogy, MaloneDies. The bed wherein Malone spends his days and 
nights seems to be in a room closely resembling that in which Molloy arrived. 
Unlike Apollonian, individualist man, Malone is certain of nothing, not even 
of his body. He describes himself as speechless and shapeless and might well 
consider himself dead, were he not under the impression that he is dying (a 
sensation he describes as being given birth to into death) because he has in his 
possession pencils (one of them French) and exercise books in which to write. 
"This exercise book is my life," he acknowledges, and it is in the stillness of 
his room broken only by the noise of his little finger gliding before his pencil 
across the paper that he knows what he has to d o . 2 5 He writes of himself, but 
he does so as if he were another. (Again the first person pronouns have been 
replaced by a third person.) But he also realizes that, as he writes, as he begins 
again to try " to live, cause to live, be another, in myself, in another," he does 
so "no longer to succeed but rather in order to f a i l . " 2 6 For nothing is certain, 
all is sheer possibility, as " the unchanging seeks relief from its form-
lessness" 2 7 —that is, as he copes with the undifferentiated All. Such failure 
was precisely what Beckett considered the aim the modern artist had to strive 
for. In his three well known Dialogues with Duthuit he stressed the fact that 
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the modern artist must abandon "a r t , craft, and good housekeeping, l iving," 
and come to realize that " t o be an artist is to fail ." 
The protagonists of the stories he tells himself while " d y i n g " (or while in 
the process of becoming a yet more Dionysian artist) are consequently more 
and more nameless as they become less and less individualized. There is 
Sapo—most likely homo sapiens', Macmann , Irish for "son of m a n " ; Moll from 
Latin mulier, woman; but there is also Lemuel, a variant of Samuel, clearly 
meant to challenge and taunt the reader with the possibility that there is, 
among this odd array of protagonists, Samuel Beckett himself, the author of 
them all. But it is in the third novel of the trilogy, The Unnamable, that the most 
radical break is made by Beckett with the Apollonian world of the principium 
individuationis and that the reader is led into the very heart of Dionysian 
formlessness. It is quite appropriate that the novel's protagonist asks at its 
very beginning "Where now? Who now? When now?" The shapeless tale's 
protagonists (if the term can be applied any longer with any justification) are, 
besides the Unnamable, Mahood (mankind) and Worm. " I say I , " asserts the 
Unnamable , "unbel ieving," and he continues to mumble " I seem to speak, it 
is not I, about me, it is not about m e . " 2 8 I have quoted him earlier as 
resolving never to say / again, yet, after that resolve even he must wonder 
"what then is the subject? Mahood? No, not yet. Worm? Even less. Bah, any 
old pronoun will do, provided one sees through i t . " 2 9 Since the Unnamable 's 
concerns are strictly those of the Dionysian writer, and things and people can 
no longer be differentiated, he must create his own reality, invent his own 
actors. As the Unnamable says " n o t I , " he invokes, nevertheless, the fictional 
characters of Beckett's earlier novels—especially those of the trilogy—, 
usurping them as if they had been his own: all the Murphys, the Molloys, the 
Malones, who each used the pronoun / . T h e inspiration seems Nietzschean, 
the irony Beckettian when the Unnamable defends the impersonal use of the 
first person made by these earlier author-heroes: " H e feels me in him, then he 
says I, as if I were he, or in another, let us be just, then he says Murphy, or 
Molloy, I forget, as if I were Malone . . . i t ' s the fault of the pronouns, there is 
no name for me, no pronoun for m e . " 3 0 It is he, the Unnamable claims, who 
invented Mahood, 
him and so many others, and the places where they passed, the places 
where they stayed in order to speak, since I had to speak, without 
speaking of me . . . I invented my memories, . . . not one is of me. It 
is they asked me to speak of them, they wanted to know what they 
were, how they lived, that suited me, I thought that would suit me, 
since I had nothing to say and had to say something, I thought I was 
free to say any old thing, so long as I didn ' t go silent. 3 1 
While silence is what he would like to attain, he must go on. For the paradox 
inherent in the artist's arrival at such Dionysian " d e a t h " is that the death 
would be meaningless if it were not also a beginning. Art is not meant to stop. 
It is simply to be "of a new order , " as Beckett had asserted in his Dialogue 
with Duthuit concerning three modern painters. There he maintained—not in 
novelistic or theatrical terms, but rather on a theoretical level—that the 
modern painter had to detach himself from the concepts of art prevalent with 
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only minor deflections since the Italian Renaissance. It was not enough for 
modern artists to realize that "Italian painters . . . surveyed the world with 
the eyes of building contractors, a mere means like any other." What was 
crucial was rather that Italian painters and those who followed their tradition 
"never stirred from the field of the possible, however much they may have 
enlarged i t . " 3 2 What Beckett found fault with in their conception of art—even 
that of such modern painters as Tal Coat, Matisse, or Masson—was their 
common assumption " that the domain of the maker is the domain of the 
feasible. The much to express, the little to express, the ability to express 
much, the ability to express little, merge into the common anxiety to express 
as much as possible, or as truly as possible, or as finely as possible, to the best 
of one's abi l i ty." 3 3 Hence to Beckett the history of painting appears to have 
been, regrettably, nothing but " the history of its attempts to escape from [its] 
sense of fa i lure ." 3 4 What Beckett equally rejects is the emphasis art historians 
have placed on the relationship of representer to representee—their attempts 
altogether to establish causal relationships, "a s though the irrationality of pi 
were an offense against the deity, not to mention his creature ." What Beckett 
envisions instead—and here he gives his unstinted admiration to the painter 
Bram Van Velde—is an aritst's total submission " to the incoercible absence of 
relation, in the absence of terms or . . . in the presence of unavailable 
t e r m s . " 3 5 He believes Van Velde to be one of the few—perhaps the only— 
modern painters to realize " that to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail, 
that failure is his world and the shrink from it desertion, art and craft, good 
housekeeping, l i v ing . " 3 6 Beckett's own acknowledgement of the paradox 
inherent in these Dionysian disquisitions seems to be an appropriate assess-
ment of his own artistic attempts in The Unnamable as well as in Not I: " I know 
that all that is required now . . . is to make of this submission, this admission, 
this fidelity to failure, a new occasion, a new term of relation, and of the act 
which, unable to act, obliged to act, he make an expressive act, even if only of 
itself, of its impossibility, of its obl igat ion." 3 7 
Of all Beckett's author-protagonists, the Unnamable clearly represents the 
height of that Dionysian spirit that Beckett himself so greatly admired in the 
artist Bram Van Velde and that he has seemingly tried to emulate: a moving 
away from individuation and an annullation of any relationship between 
representer and representee in art. In many ways, Mouth of Not / seems to be 
the Unnamable's equivalent—an analogy that has been observed by a 
number of crit ics. 3 8 Even more than the Unnamable , Mouth is deprived of 
her bodily existence. Even less than he is she shown in any relationship to the 
field of the possible. " H e r body like gone ," she is physically no more than a 
mouth that enunciates words: only her "words are coming." Like the 
Unnamable, who must go on, she "can ' t stop the s t ream," although "her 
voice is a lone." Yet while her existence and the form of her utterances 
resemble that of the Dionysian author-protagonist, the Unnamable, her own 
concerns are not predominantly those of the artist. Her questions concerning 
guilt and suffering as well as her desire to crawl back seem more closely related 
to the myth of Silenus and the biblical story of the Fall and thereby go beyond 
or stop short of man 's salvation through art that was envisioned by Nietzsche. 
While she does not say / , while she has rejected the principle of individuation 
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as completely as did the Unnamable , her drama has widened to that of 
everyman. It is almost as if she were Mahood (mankind) whom the 
Unnamable could not yet decide to use as one of his protagonist stand-ins, so 
that it is not surprising that her suffering is akin to that recognized by modern 
psychologists and psychoanalysts as inherent in human existence as such. 
Psychoanalysts such as J u n g think of man ' s appearance in the universe— 
heretofore the realm of plants and animals—as catastrophic and believe that 
his very intelligence and consciousness are a source of suffering not only for 
himself but also for all that surrounds him. Such thinking is, of course, in total 
harmony with myths and the Bible, when it asserts that suffering and 
separation are the inevitable by-products of human consciousness, because 
this consciousness ruptured and fragmented the primal oneness and world 
harmony of which man originally had been a part. Erich Neumann speaks of 
" m a n ' s original fusion with the world, with its landscape, its fauna [that] has 
its best known anthropological expression in t o t e m i s m . " 3 9 Man ' s gaining of 
consciousness set him apart from the great All and turned him into an 
individual aware of his otherness, thus splitting the universe into a subject/ 
object dichotomy that differentiates between I and thou, people and people, 
things and things. Psychoanalysts have observed, moreover, patterns of 
rupture , separation and alienation at every stage of an individual's process of 
matur ing: birth, the individual 's first assertion of independence vis-a-vis his 
mother, his family, and finally vis-a-vis society. As he attempts to define the 
various phases of ego-feeling in Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud maintains 
that "originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external 
world from itself. O u r present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken 
residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-embracing—feeling which 
corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about 
i t . " 4 0 
In a similar vein, though glancing backward rather than forward, 
Neumann thinks of man ' s birth as a loss of paradise. Writing of the infant, he 
states: 
[His] world is experienced as all-embracing . . . The world shelters 
and nourishes him, while he scarcely wills and acts at all. Doing 
nothing, lying inert in the unconscious, merely being there in the 
inexhaustible twilit world, all needs effortlessly supplied by the great 
nourisher—such is that early beatific state . . . The state of being 
contained in the whole, without responsibility or effort, with no doubts 
and no divisions . . . is paradisal and can never again be realized in its 
pristine happy-go-luckiness in adult l ife. 4 1 
A n d again we find that poets have foreshadowed such notions long before 
psychoanalysis was established as a discipline. For this is what Lionel Trilling, 
one of the finest Wordsworth critics, comments upon that poet's " O d e : 
Intimations of Mortal i ty" and " T h e Pre lude" : 
The Ode makes heavenly pre-existence the source. The Prelude finds 
the source in maternal affection. But the psychologists tell us that 
notions of heavenly pre-existence figure commonly as representations 
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of physical prenatality—the womb is the environment which is per-
fectly adapted to its inmate and compared to it all other conditions of 
life may well seem like "exi le" to the (very literal) "ou t ca s t . " 4 2 
Trilling also mentions in that respect James Joyce's near perfect evocation of 
prenatal bliss: "Before born babe bliss had. Within womb won he worship. 
Whatever in that one case done commodiously done was. (Ulysses)"*3 
But are we justified in assuming that Mouth ' s sense of exile and her wish 
to crawl back into the "godforsaken hole" (which might possibly be spelled 
w-h-o-l-e) is the equivalent of poetic longing for a lost prenatal paradise? I 
believe that Beckett's emphasis is slanted differently and that it is the play's 
title "Not I " that is of crucial significance here. For—though psychologists 
and psychoanalysts seem to have given little or no heed to this fact—it would 
seem that the child's first reference to himself or herself as I, its use of the first-
person pronoun instead of calling himself or herself by the name others have 
conferred upon him or her, must represent a giant step in a child's process of 
individuation and the development of his ego. In contrast, a conscious 
avoidance of the first person pronoun (indirectly saying "not I " ) , must be 
considered an annulment of that ego. Mouth 's not saying / resembles not only 
the lyrical poet's un-selving, but rather everyman's un-selving and deflation 
of the ego. It is in this sense that The Unnamable and Not I are not identical. The 
Unnamable''s protagonist may well be considered the surrogate of Beckett the 
writer; Mouth is, beyond that, his surrogate as a human being. The 
Unnamable arrives at Beckett's own theories about art and writing while 
putting them to work. In Not I, these theories are equally put into practice, but 
it is not Mouth who propagates them. Her desire to crawl back represents 
rather her willingness to surrender that ego-consciousness that, in Beckett's 
view, has been not only the doom of post-Renaissance artists but of modern 
man in general. It is this sense of individuation that Beckett himself would 
deny himself as he withholds it from his characters as well as his actors. It is 
Beckett himself who says: "Not I . " 
New York City 
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